We develop the concept of factional groups, or those in which members are representatives from a small number of (often just two) social entities. Such groups include many merger integration teams, bilateral task forces, and joint venture teams. We extend theory about group demography by arguing that factional groups possess preexisting faultlines that require a new conception of demographic dissimilarity. We propose that large demographic faultlines between factions engender task conflict, emotional conflict, and behavioral disintegration-which in turn lead to poor performance. We tested our model using data from 71 joint venture management groups. Data gathered in two waves strongly supported our propositions.
For decades, researchers of small groups have devoted substantial attention to understanding the effects of group composition on processes and performance. Within this broad scope, there has been a particularly strong interest in the association among demographic heterogeneity, conflict, and performance (Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003; Milliken & Martins, 1996; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998) . Although considerable theoretical and empirical progress has been made, prior studies have essentially all shared an implicit assumption that group members arrive as independent entities, all with their own demographic profiles, biases, and potential to affect group processes. In turn, under such a view, heterogeneity is thought of as the distance between all these solo actors on one or more demographic variables of interest. Even in the case of Lau and Murnighan's (1998) promising concept of "faultlines," group members are individually assessed to determine how many of their demographic attributes align with others' to form distinct schisms.
Although the assumption that members arrive as independent actors may be accurate for most groups, there are many instances in which members do not come to a group as individuals, but rather come as representative factions. Consider three such examples: (1) Following the merger of two companies, a merger integration team is formed, consisting of managers drawn from both sides. (2) Upon the signing of a joint venture (JV) agreement, each of the two parent companies assigns some of its own managers to be on the JV's new management team. (3) A task force is formed to find ways to coordinate a company's marketing and product development functions, consisting of members drawn from both areas. All three of these are "factional groups," which we define as groups in which members are representatives, or delegates, from a small number of (often just two) social entities and are aware of, and find salience in, their delegate status. Instead of coming to a team as individuals, members of a factional group come as, say, a threesome or foursome, and they combine with another twosome or threesome to constitute the team. The outside entities represented by the members (e.g., Company A vs. Company B, Plant X vs. Plant Y, Function M vs. Function N) constitute a supra-, or first-order, demographic demarcation within the group, which in turn affects how additional elements of demography will affect additional group processes. To the extent the two factions differ in additional demographic characteristicssay age, gender, and ethnicity-the greater the likelihood of in-group/out-group stereotyping, the more that each side will feel it is facing a monolithic adversary, and the more that process problems will arise.
Picture, for example, a task force that is created following the merger of a mature media company and a young Internet company. The task force, which might be charged with seeking product synergies, integrating human resource policies, or developing cross-selling opportunities, consists of people drawn about equally from the two merged firms, and who, of course, are somewhat psychologically and socially invested in their respective prior firms. By its very nature, this group has a clear demarcation; a faultline exists-or preexists. But now consider the fact that additional demographic attributes of the members also tend to reflect the differing natures of the companies they came from. Those from the mature media company tend to be in their forties, educated in humanities and liberal arts at elite private universities, and include several women; those from the Internet company, in contrast, are in their late twenties and early thirties, educated in technical and business subjects primarily at state universities, and almost all male. The faultline is even bigger than we first thought, and the corresponding potential for stereotyping, in-group/out-group classification, conflict, and distrust is heightened as well. The hypothetical group we are describing, of course, is of the type that easily could have existed following the merger of Time Warner and AOL. Among the explanations offered for the poor results of that merger, some analysts have gone beyond well-trodden ideas about how the two companies' cultures differed, to discuss the challenges of having two widely differing types of people sitting together in a roomsometimes literally lined up on opposite sides of a table-to work on a complex joint task (Munk, 2004; Swisher, 2003) .
Despite an abundance of research on small groups, very little is known about the complications and dynamics that occur within factional groups. Yet such groups are common, are often engaged in high-stakes activities, and, we can anticipate, are greatly susceptible to process problems. Moreover, as we shall argue and demonstrate, customary conceptualizations of group demography do not lead to adequate predictions about processes in factional groups. In this article, we develop the concept of factional groups and present an empirical examination of such groups using data from 71 Sino-Western joint venture management groups. We extend theory about group demography by arguing that factional groups possess a priori, preestablished faultlines (Lau & Murnighan, 1998) , which grow in width and depth as a function of additional forms of demographic dissimilarity between the factions. According to prevailing theory, overall group heterogeneity influences conflict (Jehn, 1995; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999) ; we propose that, in factional groups, any such effects are surpassed by those arising from demographic faultlines between factions. We further propose that factional faultlines, and the resulting conflict, contribute to behavioral disintegration in such groups: a diminishment of interaction, exchange, and collective effort (Hambrick, 1994; Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims, O'Bannon, & Scully, 1994) . Finally, we propose that this chain of eventsfactional faultlines, conflict, and behavioral disintegration-leads to poor performance. By gathering data on demography, group process, and performance at one point in time, and then gathering data on performance again subsequently, we overcome a common problem in this stream of research, the problem of not knowing whether group processes are affecting performance or the other way around.
We extend and apply theory from two primary sources. On the one hand, we draw from Lau and Murnighan's (1998) concept of faultlines as a way to theorize about the schisms that exist in factional groups, as well as the demographic differences that often accompany, and, in turn, deepen and widen, those schisms. We present one of the few empirical examinations so far of the faultline concept; we do so in a context, factional groups, in which the basis for a faultline-a crack or a divide-is, by definition, always present. If we can find empirical support for the faultline concept in this highly fitting context, then research can proceed to look at less clearcut instances of faultlines.
Our second major theoretical source is the work of Hambrick, Li, Xin, and Tsui (2001) , who developed a comprehensive model of how demographic differences between factions (or what they called "coalitions") within joint venture management groups can exacerbate conflict within the groups. Their model, as yet untested, encompasses elements of member demography, member psychological traits, JV ownership structure, and relationships between JV parents. We adopt (and refine) only a portion of their model, in order to contribute specifically to the literature on demography and group process. Although Hambrick and coauthors developed their model to explain dynamics within international joint venture management teams (see also Child, 1994; Pearce, 1997) , and that is the research setting we examine here, their ideas, when coupled with Lau and Murnighan's concept of faultlines, have relevance for the entire class of small groups that we term "factional." Our study represents the first theoretical exposition and empirical investigation of demography and processes in factional groups.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND The General Influences of Demography in Groups
The influence of demography on group outcomes has been extensively discussed (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Pelled et al., 1999) . As summarized by Williams and O'Reilly (1998) , demography affects group processes and outcomes through three main conduits. First, in an effort to define their identities and protect their self-esteem, individuals classify themselves and others into social categories (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) , some of which are based on demographic characteristics. Research has consistently shown that when social categorizing occurs, group members perceive out-groups as less trustworthy and capable than their in-group (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982) . Second, demography affects group processes through the tendency for people to like, trust, and interact with others whom they perceive to be similar to them (e.g., Berscheid & Walster, 1978; Byrne, 1971; Tsui & O'Reilly, 1989) . The similarity-attraction paradigm has been confirmed on a wide array of demographic attributes (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998) . Third, a group's composition has direct implications for the information and knowledge available within the group (Tsui & Gutek, 1999) . Demographic characteristics, such as nationality, education, and functional experience, serve as proxies for members' information, points of view, and mind-sets (Jackson, 1992; Jehn, 1995) .
Prior research on diversity in groups has focused overwhelmingly on the heterogeneity among all group members on one or more demographic dimensions. When the dimension of interest is nominal (e.g., gender), researchers use a Blau-like entropy measure (e.g., Polzer, Milton, & Swann, 2002) ; when the demographic variable is continuous (e.g., age), the coefficient of variation or the standard deviation is used (e.g., Pelled et al., 1999) . Sometimes researchers aggregate these scores across several demographic variables to construct a summary measure of demographic dissimilarity (e.g., Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Polzer et al., 2002) . The prevailing logic in prior research has been that each member comes to a group as an independent actor, contributing his or her demographic profile toward making the overall group either homogeneous or heterogeneous. In turn, the group's degree of diversity is expected to affect group processes and outcomes (e.g., Jehn, 1995; Pelled et al., 1999) . It is only recently, through the work of Lau and Murnighan (1998) , that there has been any consideration of how the relational demography of subgroups within larger groups might affect processes and outcomes.
Factional Faultlines
The concept of faultlines. Lau and Murnighan (1998) introduced the concept of faultlines as a way to open up consideration of demographic dissimilarity between subgroups within an overall group. A demographic faultline exists when a group contains distinct subgroups that differ on multiple demographic features. For example, a group consisting of two 50-year-old female accountants and two 30-year old male sales managers would possess a substantial faultline, with two subgroups differing cleanly on three demographic dimensions. According to Lau and Murnighan, attention to faultlines allows predictions about subgroup dynamics that cannot be generated by focusing on customary indexes of group heterogeneity.
Despite the logical appeal of the faultline concept, empirical research on it has been slow to materialize. Researchers have invoked the concept in qualitative studies (e.g., Dyck & Starke, 1999; Ely & Thomas, 2001 ), but the measurement and application of faultlines in large-sample quantitative research has been relatively limited, and the results of the research conducted to date have been difficult to reconcile or consolidate. In a study of 79 student groups, Thatcher, Jehn, and Zanutto (2003) found that the magnitude of demographic faultlines was negatively related to measures of conflict (rather than positively related, as was hypothesized); supplementary analysis indicated that the relationship was best described as U-shaped. A related study, by Gibson and Vermeulen (2003) , examined the existence of "subgroups" (but without directly invoking the faultline concept) in a large sample of teams and found-again at odds with Lau and Murnighan's expectations-that teams that had moderately strong demographic subgroups reported more learning behaviors than those without distinct subgroups. In an earlier study, Earley and Mosakowski (2000) used both qualitative field research and laboratory studies to generate findings that were somewhat consistent with, but not quite the same as, Gibson and Vermeulen's. Specifically, they found that teams that were homogeneous and those that were heterogeneous (on nationality) outperformed moderately heterogeneous teams. Although Earley and Mosakowski did not calculate team faultlines by examining multiple demographic variables, as Lau and Murnighan originally proposed, they concluded that moderately heterogeneous teams be thought of as having major faultlines (two to three nationalities represented, each with several members), whereas homogeneous teams (all one nationality) and very heterogeneous teams (individual members from an array of nationalities) do not have faultlines.
The challenges in studying faultlines may be both theoretical and methodological, and we will note one challenge of each type. First, in order for faultlines to affect a group's process, they must (as Lau and Murnighan noted) somehow be "activated" or otherwise relevant to the group's task. If a demographic schism exists, but group members fail to notice it or to attach any salience to it, the gulf will not affect behaviors. Second, measurement of faultlines is daunting. Per Lau and Murnighan, a researcher can only calculate faultlines by examining every pair of members on every demographic dimension, in search of patterns of distinct differences. The seeds of a faultline might exist in a gender difference between two members but then be negated by their racial similarity. When all of these possibilities are considered, it is unlikely that field settings will yield many instances of distinct faultlines for study. But by studying faultlines in factional groups, we were able to surmount these challenges and develop a new way to extend Lau and Murnighan's ideas. As importantly, however, we shed light on the dynamics of factional groups, which are sufficiently prevalent and distinctive as to warrant attention in their own right.
Factional groups. A factional group consists of members who are drawn from, and are expected, to some degree, to represent, a small number of social entities that exist outside the boundaries of the group. The extent to which members attach salience to their status as representative delegates, or deem such status a "primary social role demarcation" (Hughes, 1971 ), depends upon two major factors. First, members will attach salience to the factional nature of a group to the extent that their role as delegates is explicit, rather than implicit. Members who have been told that they are representing an outside entity, and that others are representing a different entity, will attach more salience to the factions than members whose representative status is unstated. For example, one of us was asked to serve on a task force to examine his university's family leave policies. At the first meeting, the fact that the group consisted of three men and three women was incidental, not particularly even noticed-until, that is, the organizer said, "We're committed to having male and female views equally represented." From that point on, members were very mindful of their status as representative delegates, and they spoke, acted, and perceived each other accordingly. The literature on "the representative effect" indicates that agents who expressly represent others act in accord with their sponsored status, striving to do what their sponsors will applaud (e.g., Kesner, Shapiro, & Sharma, 1994) .
Second, members will attach more salience to the factional nature of a group to the degree that they (and their sponsors) are wary of the other side. If there is a preexisting distrust, or an a priori reason to believe that the two sides will be engaged in a contest to prevail over each other, then members will be very mindful of their status as delegates (Sherif & Sherif, 1964) .
From here on, we will discuss factional groups by assuming that their members are aware of and attach salience to the factions. Interesting research could be done, however, to examine the degree to which group members perceive factions to exist.
Factional faultlines. Whereas Lau and Murnighan (1998) depicted faultiness as occurring by happenstance, or naturally, factional groups have what might be thought of as a priori, or engineered, faultlines. When the members of a group are appointed as representatives of outside entities, a demarcation is established that becomes the basis on which other elements of demography need to be assessed. Instead of having to search computationally for a faultline among all pairs of individual members, in a factional group we can locate the faultline according to the membership of the representative factions.
In turn, such a faultline deepens, widens, and grows larger when the two factions differ distinctly in their demographic characteristics. A distinct difference in a given demographic characteristic is one in which the averages, or central tendencies, of the two factions differ widely and each faction is relatively homogeneous, or tightly clustered, around its own central tendency. The overall size of the factional faultline-its aggregate width and depth-is the sum total of such differences between the two factions.
Returning to the hypothetical AOL-Time Warner task force described above, Figure 1 portrays the profiles of the two factions on four demographic characteristics: age, gender, undergraduate major, and undergraduate institution. Even without specifying a measurement approach, one can easily see that the two factions differed substantially across all four dimensions; thus, the factional faultline was relatively large.
Our definition of factional group does not necessarily mean that sizeable faultlines will inevitably exist in every factional group. However, factional groups are prone to large faultlines, because the factions, by their very nature, are often drawn from distinctly different work populations, which may be embedded in very different institutional arrangements. For example, the demographic differ-ences in the hypothetical AOL-Time Warner group reflected underlying differences in the industries, histories, and cultures of the two previously separate firms. Additionally, consider the case of international joint venture managers who are drawn from two different companies in two different national cultures. Their respective demographic profiles will reflect fundamentally different sets of social institutions, including education systems and labor markets, which may lead to wholesale demographic differences between the two sets of managers (Whitley, 1992) . Each parent firm will have its own management selection and development practices, yielding its own distinctive set of managers who are eligible for JV assignments. As a result, we anticipate that factional groups will often manifest sizeable faultlines.
HYPOTHESES Proposed Effects on Group Processes
Although diversity within a group can yield benefits (e.g., Jehn et al., 1999; Watson, Kumar, & Michaelson, 1993) , prior research indicates that heterogeneity often impairs group functioning (e.g., Milliken & Martins, 1996; Pelled et al., 1999; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998) . Similarly, even though factional groups are often formed out of a belief that the two sets of members possess valuable complementarities, we can anticipate that large demographic faultlines between factions will engender group dysfunction-as Lau and Murnighan (1998) envisioned for "faultlined" groups in general. In developing our hypotheses, we drew upon (and adapted) Hambrick and colleagues' (2001) comprehensive model of how the characteristics of joint venture management groups affect venture performance. We focused on only a portion of Hambrick et al.'s model, in an effort to contribute specifically to the literature on group demography, group processes, and performance. In particular, we argue here that, in factional groups, the size of the factional faultline will be positively related to emotional conflict and task conflict, which in turn will engender behavioral disintegration within the group, which in turn will impair the performance of the group. Our model is shown in Figure 2 . Thus, in keeping with Hambrick et al.'s model, we anticipate that large factional faultlines set off a generally unfavorable chain of events.
Emotional conflict. Sometimes called "relationship conflict" (Evan, 1965; Jehn, 1995) or "affective conflict" (Guetzkow & Gyr, 1954; Pelled, 1996) , emotional conflict involves interpersonal incompatibilities, including annoyance, mistrust, and animosity. Following from the well-known tendency for people to be drawn to, like, and trust others like themselves, and to avoid, distrust, and dislike those who are dissimilar (e.g., Byrne, 1971; Tsui & O'Reilly, 1989) , abundant evidence exists that demographic differences engender emotional conflict (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Pelled et al., 1999) . Differences in readily apparent personal characteristics (e.g., gender, race, age) have been particularly found to give rise to mistrust and dislike in group settings, as a result of stereotyping (Jackson, 1992; Pelled, 1996) . However, even differences in less visible traits (e.g., functional backgrounds) can stir emotional conflict, as group members personalize the differences in their professional paradigms and priorities (Pelled & Adler, 1994) .
In factional groups, the likelihood of large fault-
FIGURE 1 Hypothetical Product Integration Team at AOL-Time Warner
lines engendering emotional conflict is particularly great, because the groups are inherently divided and thus, in-group/out-group categorization will tend to occur (Alderfer, 1987; Tajfel, 1982; Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978) . Further, members will tend to identify more with their in-group than with the full group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) . These cognitive processes give rise to in-group/out-group hostility, or to individuals seeing their in-group as worthy and efficacious, and seeing their out-group as unworthy and incapable (Tajfel, 1982) .
Hypothesis 1a. The larger a factional faultline, the greater the emotional conflict in a group.
Task conflict. Large faultlines also give rise to task conflict, or intellectual opposition, among members regarding the content of the tasks being performed (Jehn, 1995; Pelled & Adler, 1994) . When factions are of widely differing backgrounds, they bring divergent experiences and frames of reference to problem solving, which each takes to be valid (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Trompenaars, 1993) . As a result of differing experiences, members may disagree, for example, on matters encompassing supervisory policies, risk taking, control systems, urgency, and others (e.g., Perlmutter & Hennan, 1986) .
Factions that differ widely in their backgrounds diverge in the "givens" they bring to an administrative situation (March & Simon, 1958) , including their knowledge of alternatives and their estimates of consequences attached to alternatives (Pelled, 1996) . These differences will emerge as task conflict.
Hypothesis 1b. The larger a factional faultline, the greater the task conflict in a group.
Behavioral disintegration. Conflict can be thought of as opposing valences (emotional or cognitive) within a group, but it does not in itself describe task interactions. Researchers have invoked a number of constructs to describe the degree to which, and how, group members interact. These constructs include communication (Smith et al., 1994) , collaboration (Chatman & Flynn, 2001) , and social interaction (Chatman, Polzer, Barsade, & Neale, 1998) . In an attempt to develop a unified construct to describe the tendency for some management groups to engage in more "teamlike" behaviors than others, Hambrick (1994) set forth the concept of behavioral integration. Defined as "the degree to which mutual and collective interaction exists within the group" (Hambrick, 1994: 188) , behavioral integration has three main manifestations: information exchange, collaborative behavior, and joint decision making. In its focus on substantive interaction, behavioral integration is distinct from "social integration," which places more emphasis on members' sense of "group cohesiveness" or "team spirit" (Seashore, 1977; Shaw, 1981; Smith et al., 1994) .
The obverse of behavioral integration, disintegration, can be expected to be an integral, so far unexamined, by-product of conflict in a group.
1 If emotional conflict is great, and members dislike each other, they will want to avoid each other and try to compartmentalize their tasks.
Hypothesis 2a. The greater the emotional conflict in a group, the greater the behavioral disintegration.
Research on the effects of task conflict on group processes has yielded mixed results (summarized in Jehn [1995] ). An absence of task conflict may mean that competing ideas are not aired or detected; indeed, moderate amounts of task conflict 1 We reverse Hambrick's term, calling it "disintegration," to simplify the wording of hypotheses and accompanying discussion. We use the label to convey the direct inverse of behavioral integration.
FIGURE 2
Conceptual Model: Factional Faultlines, Group Process, and Performance can be healthy, especially when there are explicit norms that support debate and contention (Jehn, 1995 (Jehn, , 1997 ). But a very high level of task conflict can cause member dissatisfaction and withdrawal from group affairs. In one of the most thorough tests conducted, Jehn (1995) hypothesized and found that task conflict was negatively related to member satisfaction, intention to remain in a group, and group production. As one of Jehn's group members said, "I don't know if I like working in a group where there is so much arguing" (1995: 271) . A recent meta-analysis indicates an overall negative association between task conflict and both member satisfaction and group performance (DeDreu & Weingart, 2003) .
Accordingly, we expect that a high level of task conflict-accompanied by intense disagreements and possibly even outright arguments-will drive members apart. They will tire of the tension in their group and try to insulate their activities from each other (Amason, 1996; Evan, 1965; Jehn, 1994) . In this vein, Hambrick and his coauthors reported an instance of a factional joint venture management group, in which conflict led to behavioral disintegration: "They sharply reduced their interactions; decision-making became rigid and mechanical; . . . several scheduled management meetings were cancelled" (2001: 1046 -1047).
Hypothesis 2b. The greater the task conflict in a group, the greater the behavioral disintegration.
By extension:
Hypothesis 2c. The larger a factional faultline in a group, the greater the behavioral disintegration in the group. Emotional conflict and task conflict mediate this relationship.
Effects on Subsequent Performance
Our preceding hypotheses addressed how faultlines in factional groups affect group processes. Now we address the implications of these processes for subsequent group performance. We begin with the construct that, in our model, is most proximate to performance: behavioral disintegration.
Conceptualizing behavioral integration (the inverse of disintegration) provides a way to unify consideration of "team properties" in management groups (Hambrick, 1994) . Social psychologists have long noted the positive effects on group performance of the main elements of behavioral integration: communication, collaboration, and joint decision making (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; McGrath, 1984; Shaw, 1981) . Shaw wrote that "if a group is to function effectively, its members must be able to communicate easily and efficiently " (1981: 150) . Similarly, Hambrick (1995) concluded from field interviews that behavioral disintegration generally causes group problems, including failure to exchange key information, poor coordination of activities, and difficulty in formulating and implementing responses to environmental shifts.
To conduct their tasks effectively, the JV management groups we studied needed to communicate fluidly, collaborate, and engage in joint decision making. These groups were responsible for the execution of their ventures' strategies (which were largely set by the parent firms), and as such needed to intensively coordinate operations, marketing, sales, and human resources. Essentially all the JVs we studied were active in only a single business, and only in China. Therefore, there was little basis for creation of autonomous or stand-alone subunits. To the extent that these groups were behaviorally fragmented, they were undermanaging or mismanaging their interdependence, which in turn would cause poor performance.
Hypothesis 3a. Behavioral disintegration within a group will be negatively associated with subsequent group performance.
By extension, we can encompass the constructs that appear earlier in our causal chain: In sum, we have laid out an integrated portrayal of the distinctive challenges that arise when groups consist of preestablished factions. We anticipate that, in factional groups, large demographic faultlines between factions will bring about task conflict and emotional conflict, and in turn behavioral disintegration. Finally, these process problems will be associated with poor subsequent performance (even given analytical controls for initial performance).
RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS

Joint Venture Management Groups: The Research Context
Joint venture management groups are prototypical factional groups. Joint ventures inherently involve some uncertainty and mistrust between partners (Pearce, 1997) . Among the ways that partners seek to strengthen their positions is by securing control of key management positions in a JV (Child, 1994; Geringer & Hebert, 1989) . (See Mann [1989] and Hambrick et al. [2001] for examples of the creation and dynamics of JV management groups.) As an outgrowth of the inevitable strain of running a business having two (or more) owners, JV managers are expected to protect their respective parents' interests and ensure that their counterparts do not try to abuse those interests, while trying to contribute to the success of the JV itself (Shenkar & Zeira, 1992) .
Our portrayal of JV management groups as factional is generally accurate but has limits. First, it applies only to JV management groups that have representatives expressly drawn from the two parents, thus excluding "dominant parent JVs," which are managed entirely by just one parent, and "independent JVs," which are given considerable autonomy, including in managerial hiring (Geringer & Hebert, 1989) .
2 A second limit to our portrayal is that it applies most strongly for relatively new JVs, whose parents are especially unsure of each other. Over time (and with some successes), a JV may take on the characteristics of an independent business, and the management group may become less factional. As we will describe, our sample consisted only of JV management groups that had managers drawn from both parents; most of the JVs were relatively young, but we still controlled for JV age.
It is useful to understand the tasks of JV management groups. Joint ventures are tightly specified business entities (Child, 1994; Kogut, 1988) , often with contractually defined products, markets, technologies, raw materials, and staffing policies that are specified through intensive negotiations between the parent companies (Frayne & Geringer, 1995; Schuler, 2001) . Therefore, compared to other top management groups, JV management groups have relatively little strategic discretion. Additionally, these groups, or at least those we studied in China, generally face considerable task interdependence. As noted earlier, all the JVs we studied were functionally organized, engaged in single lines of business, and operating only in China. Thus, compared to management groups in organizations that consist of easily divisible, autonomous subunits, these JV management groups faced significant needs to coordinate their activities.
Sample and Data Sources
Sample. We tested the hypotheses using data from the management team members of Sino-foreign ventures in China. Sample firms were identified from the international joint ventures listed in the membership directories of foreign (specifically, American and European) Chambers of Commerce in China. The geographic areas targeted were Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong, the primary locales for JVs in China. From the membership directories, we were able to identify 449 JVs. The general managers of all 449 joint ventures were initially contacted; 48 were dropped after letters were returned undelivered, leaving 401 JVs contacted.
The invitation letter explained that we sought to survey all members of the top management team of the joint venture. Among the 401 general managers contacted, 104 agreed to participate, for a 26 percent response rate. This agreement was achieved after three rounds of attempts (two mailings and a final round of phone calls). To check for nonresponse bias, we compared available JV characteristics from the directories, including industry, investment location, and parent nationality for both responding (104) and nonresponding (297) JVs. The results did not show any bias in the sample.
Once a general manager (GM) agreed to participate, we worked closely with him or her to obtain the list of the JV leadership team members and to determine whether each member should receive an English or Chinese version of the questionnaire. We asked the GM to include himself or herself, the venture's deputy general manager (if such a position existed), and all employees directly reporting to these two positions. We requested the GM to initiate a memo to each management team member, encouraging participation in the study. The surveys were then sent to all the managers, along with return envelopes so that respondents could mail their completed surveys directly back to us. A total of 677 managers at the 104 participating JVs received surveys. We received 640 completed surveys after three rounds of reminders, a number representing a response rate of 94.5 percent of the managers from the JVs that agreed to participate.
Because our interest was in the demographic faultlines between expatriate and local managers, we excluded 21 JVs that had either only expatriates or only locals among the respondents. We also excluded 12 JVs that had only one expatriate or one local manager. Thus, our final sample included 71 joint ventures with a minimum of 4 top managers on their teams and at least two expatriate managers and two local. The 71 joint ventures had a total of 535 managers, from whom we received 513 usable surveys, representing 96 percent of those requested. Respondents include 168 expatriate managers (assigned by the foreign parents) and 345 local managers (assigned by the Chinese parents). The joint venture management teams in our sample had an average size of 8 members.
Three questionnaires. The first wave of data was collected from two questionnaires administered in 2000. The main questionnaire, sent to every manager, asked a series of perceptual questions about team processes, as well as questions about the manager himself or herself. Guided by theoretical considerations and field interviews, we developed the questionnaire in English, translated it into Chinese, and subjected it to back-translation. Both versions were cross-checked by three bilingual management professors. We pretested the questionnaire with 24 managers in five JVs, as well as with representatives from parent companies in Beijing. We also asked these managers to identify any ambiguities in the questionnaire and made some minor changes on the basis of their feedback.
The second questionnaire, seeking background information on the JVs, was sent to two top managers on each team (the GM and the deputy GM, if available, or another manager). This background survey sought basic factual information about the joint venture, such as founding year and performance. Our goal was to receive two background surveys per JV, to allow tests of interrater reliability. We received two background surveys from 66 JVs, and one for the remaining five. When there were two respondents, they had 100 percent agreement on founding year and very high interrater reliability on their overall assessment of current JV performance (r ϭ .83, p Ͻ .001), which are the only background variables we use here.
In early 2003, about two and a half years after the initial data collection, we gathered data on JV performance again. This lag was long enough to allow the effects of the group processes initially measured to be manifested in business performance (sales volumes, efficiencies, employee morale, and so on), but not so long as to allow intervening events to make performance untraceable to the observed JV management groups. This time span is also consistent with the lag commonly used in research on management team effects or JV performance (Beamish & Delios, 1997; Peterson, Owens, & Martorana, 1999) . Upon recontacting the JVs, we learned that 7 of the initial 71 had ceased operations. In most of these cases, we succeeded in contacting one of the original parent companies, which uniformly verified that the JVs were no longer in business (as opposed to acquired, moved, etc.). For the 64 JVs that were still in operation, we administered another questionnaire to the GMs and deputy GMs (who, in some cases, were different people than in 2000), in which we asked for ratings of current performance. Again, in those cases for which we had two respondents, interrater reliability was high (r ϭ .85, p Ͻ .001). For an additional indicator of reliability, we asked the respondents in 2003 to rate their JVs' performance back in 2000, the period of our original data collection. The correlation between their ratings of 2000 performance and our originally gathered ratings of 2000 performance was .84 (p Ͻ .001), further indicating the managers' performance assessments were highly reliable.
Measures
Group process variables.
Measures for the group process variables were obtained from the managers' surveys. Emotional conflict was measured by three Likert-style questionnaire items (1, "strongly disagree"; 2, "disagree"; 3, "agree"; 4, "strongly agree") which were adapted from Jehn (1994) . These included (1) "There is a great deal of emotional friction among members of this group," (2) "There is a great deal of personality clash within the group," and (3) "There is a great deal of mutual trust among top managers of this JV" (reverse-coded). The Cronbach alpha for the three items was satisfactory (.76), indicating that they could be averaged to form a reliable measure. Further, aggregation to the overall group level was justified by an eta-square of .28 (p Ͻ .001), a value that surpasses the .20 that is generally regarded as suitable evidence of interrater consistency (Georgopoulos, 1986) . The emotional conflict score, then, was a group's grand average of three items across all members (Pelled et al., 1999) .
Task conflict was measured by two items adapted from Jehn (1994) : (1) "There is a great deal of disagreement about the operational decisions of the JV" and (2) "There are major differences of opinion in the group about executing the JV's strategy." Respondents used the same four-point scale used for emotional conflict. The task conflict score is the group's average of two items across all members (␣ ϭ .71; 2 ϭ .27, p Ͻ .001). Behavioral integration was measured by four items adapted from Hambrick (1994): (1) "All the top managers have a voice in major decisions affecting the JV," (2) "Communications among top managers can best be described as open and fluid," (3) "When major decisions are made affecting the whole JV, the top managers collectively exchange their points of view," and (4) "The top managers of the JV frequently share their experience and expertise." The scale was as above. The behavioral integration score was thus the group's average of four items across all members (␣ ϭ.72; 2 ϭ .31, p Ͻ .001). Behavioral disintegration, the direct inverse of behavioral integration, was measured as the maximum value of the scale (4.00) minus the value of behavioral integration.
The results of an exploratory factor analysis, shown in Table 1 , established the discriminant validity of the three group process variables. With a "promax" rotation, the emergent structure aligned with our conceptualization, providing psychometric support for the measures of team processes.
Performance. Our ultimate dependent variable, subsequent performance (in 2003) , and one of our control variables, performance (in 2000, the time of the initial survey), were calculated identically. General managers and deputy general managers were asked to rate current performance (either in 2000 or 2003) on two items. One question asked, "What is your overall assessment of the JV's current performance?" (1, "very unsuccessful"; 5, "very successful"). The second asked, "Compared to its competitors in China, how do you assess this JV's current performance?" (1, "among the worst"; 5, "among the best"). Respondents' scores for these two items were highly correlated (r ϭ.91 in 2000, r ϭ .94 in 2003). Therefore, we averaged them to form a two-item index. When we had responses from both managers, their scores were averaged. (As noted above, interrater consistency was very high.) We did not attempt to use specific dimensions of performance, such as profitability or sales growth, because JVs are known to vary widely in their objectives (Pearce, 1997) . Research by Dess and Robinson (1984) has shown that managerial ratings of business performance are very highly correlated with relevant objective measures.
In measuring 2003 performance, we faced the question of how to treat the seven JVs that had ceased operations. Because JV cessation is often treated as organizational failure (Beamish & Delios, 1997) , and because parent company managers uniformly indicated that the JVs had closed (often using expressions such as, "It didn't work out" or "We've decided to try a different path"), we decided to treat these seven JVs as cases of extremely low performance by giving them a score of 1 on our 2003 performance scale. This approach allowed us to retain our full sample of 71 joint ventures. We also conducted analyses based upon only the 64 surviving JVs, with results highly consistent with those we report.
Factional faultline size. Recall that the size of a factional faultline is the sum of demographic differences between two factions. Before we describe our measurement, it is important to note that certain elements of demography follow almost axiomatically from the nature of each faction's sponsor. In every JV management group in our study, for instance, one faction came from a Chinese company and the other from a Western company; and one faction consisted of Chinese (PRC) nationals and the other did not (We shall discuss ethnicity momentarily.) Because of these relatively uniform differences in "axiomatic" demography, and the absence of variance across the JV management groups, we did not formally consider such differ- ences in our analyses; a different sample, however, could warrant and allow such consideration. In constructing our measure of factional faultline size, we focused on four demographic dimensions, all of which have been prominent in prior research. These four dimensions were member age, tenure, gender, and ethnicity (e.g., Jehn et al., 1999; Pelled et al., 1999; Tsui & O'Reilly, 1989) . Age and tenure were continuous variables. Gender was binary, as was ethnicity (Chinese or non-Chinese). All the local managers were Chinese, and about half of the expatriate managers were also ethnic Chinese (from Taiwan, America, Malaysia, etc.). We excluded functional backgrounds, because all the groups had a full complement of functional backgrounds (reflecting their functional structures). We excluded amount of education because our field research suggested that it was not socially salient in these cross-cultural groups (i.e., Western managers had little awareness or appreciation for the amount of education of Chinese managers, and vice versa). We also excluded nationality, because it exactly covaried with the distinction between local managers (who were all from the People's Republic of China) and expatriates (only a few of whom had nationalities that differed from their parent company headquarters countries).
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Recall that a large difference in accompanying demography exists when two factions differ in their averages and each faction is tightly clustered around its own average. A minor modification of the d-statistic, which is widely used for testing the effects of experimental treatments (Cohen, 1988; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998) , provides a highly suitable measure:
where X A and X B are the means of each managerial faction on a particular demographic dimension, and A and B are the standard deviations of each faction on that dimension (with a constant of 1 added, to handle cases when both factions are completely homogeneous (i.e., have standard deviations of zero). Not only is this measure suitable for measuring differences for the two interval-scaled dimensions, age and tenure, but it also is suitable for two-category nominal variables, such as gender and our binary measure of ethnicity (where the relevant statistics are expressed as percentages). This modified d-statistic would not work if a nominal demographic variable had more than two values (such as multiple nationalities or multiple functional areas). Because we were interested in the size of the overall demographic faultline between factions, rather than differences on individual dimensions alone, we created a summative measure. Other demography researchers have followed a similar approach in constructing measures of heterogeneity (e.g., Jehn et al., 1999; Polzer et al., 2002) . First, we standardized the four difference scores (because they had differing scales; x ϭ 0, s.d. ϭ 1); then we added the four together to create our overall measure of factional faultline size. 4 We report supplementary analysis showing results for the individual forms of demographic differences, as well as for alternative constructions of our demographic difference measure.
Control variables. We included several control variables. The first was JV age, measured as the number of years a venture had existed. Team size was included, because it is known to influence group dynamics (Brewer & Kramer, 1986) , and larger teams have more potential for heterogeneity (Bantel & Jackson, 1989) . We controlled for the unevenness of the faction sizes, with subgroup imbalance, measured as the absolute percentage of difference between the ratio of the two subgroup sizes (e.g., 2/3 or .67) and equality (.50). Finally, we controlled for the mean demographic profiles of the JV management groups, by including mean member age, mean member tenure, percent female, and percent Chinese.
Overall group heterogeneity. To compare results based upon factional faultlines to those that would be obtained by examining conventional measures of heterogeneity, we created an index, team diversity, which was the sum of the following scores (standardized): the standard deviation of age, the standard deviation of tenure, gender diversity (using Pelled et al.'s [1999] measure), and Chi-nese ethnic diversity (again using Pelled et al.'s measure).
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RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are presented in Table 2 . 6 We used hierarchical regression analysis to test our hypotheses, applying tests proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) and Sobel (1982) to determine whether hypothesized mediation existed.
Group Processes
Regression results are reported in Table 3 . Model 1 shows results for emotional conflict. Our measure of factional faultline size was highly significant; team diversity, as conventionally measured, was not significant. Model 1 explained significantly more variance than a baseline model (not reported here) that excluded factional faultline size (model 1, R 2 ϭ .26, p Ͻ .05). Thus, in support of Hypothesis 1a, factional faultline size was positively related to emotional conflict.
Model 2 shows results for task conflict. Factional faultline size showed a significant (p Ͻ .01), positive effect on task conflict; again, the explained variance (R 2 ϭ .25, p Ͻ .05) was significantly greater than that for a baseline model that excluded factional faultline size. Hypothesis 1b was supported: The size of factional faultlines in the JV teams was positively related to task conflict.
Models 3-5 report results for behavioral disintegration. Model 3, which included controls and the two conflict variables, indicates that current performance was negatively related to behavioral disintegration. As hypothesized, emotional conflict was significantly and positively related to behavioral disintegration, supporting Hypothesis 2a. Task conflict, however, showed no association with behavioral disintegration; therefore Hypothesis 2b was not supported.
When factional faultline size was included, in Model 4, it showed its own positive effect (p Ͻ .05); the R 2 -statistic for this model was .30, a significant increase over a baseline model that excluded factional faultline size. Therefore, we find support for part of Hypothesis 2c: There was a positive association between factional faultline size and behavioral disintegration.
We tested the other part of Hypothesis 2c-the expectation of mediation-by comparing models 3, 4, and 5. Model 5 included emotional conflict, task conflict, and factional faultline size. The effect from factional faultline size (observed in model 4) disappeared in the full model; the effect from emotional conflict (observed in model 3) remained very strong; and task conflict had no effects. Thus, the results of Baron and Kenny's (1986) test partially supported Hypothesis 2c: Factional faultline size was positively related to behavioral disintegration, but it was entirely mediated by emotional conflict, and not at all by task conflict.
As a further test of the mediation effects hypothesized in Hypothesis 2c, we used the procedures outlined in Sobel (1982) . Specifically, we computed the standard error for each mediated effect and then used this parameter to compute Z-scores for each mediated effect. In accord with results of the Baron and Kenny test, the Sobel tests indicated that emotional conflict was a strong (p Ͻ .01) mediator between factional faultline size and behavioral disintegration, while task conflict exhibited no effects.
Subsequent Performance
We turn now to our analysis of subsequent (2003) performance. Model 6 included the two conflict variables, and model 7 added behavioral disintegration. As hypothesized, behavioral disintegration in the JV management groups was significantly, negatively related to subsequent JV performance, supporting Hypothesis 3a (model 7). Moreover, emotional conflict was negatively related to JV performance, supporting Hypothesis 3b. Task conflict, however, showed no association with performance; therefore, Hypothesis 3c was not supported.
The other part of Hypotheses 3b and 3c, the statement that behavioral disintegration mediates the effects of emotional conflict and task conflict, was tested via comparisons of models 3, 6, and 7. Model 6 included emotional conflict and task conflict. The significance level of emotional conflict decreased (but did not disappear) once we included behavioral disintegration in model 7; task conflict had no effects. Therefore, according to Baron and Kenny's (1986) criteria, behavioral disintegration only partially mediated the negative effect of emotional conflict on subsequent performance. A further test, following Sobel's (1982) procedures, suggested that the mediated effect was not significant for emotional conflict. Therefore, the mediation envisioned in Hypothesis 3b was not supported with this strong form of test; instead, emotional conflict exerted its own direct negative effect on performance.
Model 8 added factional faultline size, which exhibited a significant (p Ͻ .05), negative association with performance; the variance explained was significantly greater than for a baseline model (not shown) that excluded factional faultline size (R 2 ϭ .31, p Ͻ .05). Therefore, we find support for part of Hypothesis 3d: There was a negative association between factional faultline size and subsequent JV performance.
Finally, in models 7, 8, and 9 we found evidence that group processes fully mediated the negative association between factional faultline size and later performance. Model 9 included all predictors. The effects of factional faultline size (observed in model 8) disappeared in the full model; the effects of emotional conflict and behavioral disintegration (observed in model 7) remained very strong; and task conflict had no effects. A further test following Sobel's (1982) procedures confirmed that the mediated effect was significant for both emotional conflict (p Ͻ .05) and behavioral disintegration (p Ͻ .01). Therefore, the mediation expected in Hypothesis 3d was found for emotional conflict and behavioral disintegration, but no mediation was found for task conflict.
In sum, our results indicate that factional faultline size in these 71 JV teams had substantial associations with group processes and later performance. Figure 3 , a revision of our earlier theorized model, graphically depicts our results. The sizes of the faultlines were positively associated with emotional conflict, task conflict, and behavioral disintegration. The link between faultline size and behavioral disintegration, however, was fully mediated by emotional conflict. That is, faultlines stimulated emotional and task conflict, but it was FIGURE 3 Portrayal of Results emotional conflict that gave rise to behavioral disintegration. Finally, our results indicate that emotional conflict and behavioral disintegration were both strongly, negatively related to subsequent performance, fully mediating the triggering effects of faultlines. Throughout all these analyses, the statistical influence of factional faultline size was appreciably stronger than that observed for conventional measures of overall demographic heterogeneity.
DISCUSSION
A factional group is like two groups in one. Although this duality may provide complementary perspectives that can be valuable for group problem solving (Jackson, 1992) , the preexisting schism that separates the two subgroups also causes process losses (Lau & Murnighan, 1998) . Our study indicates that these process losses are exacerbated by demographic differences between the two factions. We find that, for factional groups, the sizes of the faultlines between the factions are much more strongly related to emotional conflict, task conflict, and behavioral disintegration than are customary measures of overall group heterogeneity. Indeed, it may be that results from some earlier studies of group heterogeneity (summarized in Williams and O'Reilly [1998] and Webber and Donahue [2001] ) may be contradictory because some of the studied teams consisted of preexisting factions. These factions may have formed demarcations along which demographically triggered social processes then occurred (Lau & Murnighan, 1998) .
Our survey data do not reveal the operative mechanism(s) that convert factional faultlines into group processes. But in view of prior research, we envision that classic social categorization (Kramer, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1986 ) and dissimilarityaversion (Berscheid & Walster, 1978; Byrne, 1971) were at work in the groups we studied. Members almost certainly attached some salience to their delegate status; they were aware of having fellow delegates from the same sponsor; and they saw that there were delegates "on the other side" representing a different sponsor. All these conditions combined to create an a priori faultline, a distinct ingroup/out-group situation. When there were large demographic differences between the two factions, stereotyping, distrust, and discord all likely mounted (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Pelled, 1996) , raising levels of emotional conflict, task conflict, and behavioral disintegration.
Our study provides one of the first empirical examinations of the role of behavioral (dis)integration as an intervening mechanism between conflict and performance. Although task conflict and emotional conflict capture disagreement and dislike, respectively, they stop short of indicating the degree to which a group engages in collective interaction. Introduced as a way to describe a group's overall degree of mutual and collective interaction, behavioral integration is manifested in information sharing, joint decision making, and collaboration (Hambrick, 1994) . As such, this construct is highly related to, but more encompassing than, some related constructs, such as information sharing (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002) , communication frequency (Smith et al., 1994) , interaction (Chatman et al., 1998) , and collaboration (Wagner, 1995) . Some groups exhibit a great deal of information exchange, fluid communication, and collaboration; others exhibit member withdrawal, separatism, and parochial effort (Hambrick, 1994) .
In line with Hambrick and colleagues' (2001) earlier model, we found that emotional conflict engendered behavioral disintegration; that is, dislike drove group members apart in conducting their work. In contrast, however, task conflict did not have an effect on behavioral disintegration. Contrary to our hypotheses, the groups we studied were able to surmount any task-related discord in their efforts to operate as interactive wholes. Or perhaps some of the groups adopted constructive norms for dealing with task conflict (Jehn, 1999) .
Finally, emotional conflict and behavioral disintegration led to poor performance in our sample. Emotional conflict impaired performance both through its effect on behavioral disintegration and through an additional, direct effect on performance. In line with essentially all prior research, then, emotional conflict in our JV management groups was very harmful to performance (Jehn, 1999) . Further, behavioral disintegration was strongly predictive of poor performance. When considerable task interdependence exists-as was the case for the JV management groups we studied-groups that do not function as collective wholes will not perform well. Indeed, we believe that behavioral disintegration may be an essential link in the breakdown of group efforts, standing between conflict on the one hand and poor performance on the other. In factional groups, this cascade of dysfunction is greatly propelled by large demographic faultlines between factions.
It might be asked whether the passage of time, and the sustained interaction that goes with it, allows group members to surmount their stereotypes and categorizations, thus diminishing the effects of faultlines on group processes (e.g., Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002; Jehn et al., 1999) . To test for this possibility, we examined (in analyses not shown) the moderating effects of group tenure on the relationships we have reported. Regardless of whether we treated group tenure as a continuous variable or constructed a dummy variable to indicate relatively new teams (those with mean tenures of less than one year or two years), we found no significant interaction effects. The effects of factional faultlines on group processes did not diminish in proportion to a group's time together. Although a larger sample with greater statistical power is needed to confirm our result, we found that the influence of factional faultlines on group processes showed no signs of being temporary.
In constructing our measure of factional faultline size, we summed across four demographic variables, following others Polzer et al., 2002) who have used aggregate measures of demographic dissimilarity. One might ask, however, whether all four variables contributed to the results we found, or whether perhaps just one or two of the demographic characteristics largely accounted for the patterns observed. To address this question, we conducted supplementary analysis. Table 4 reports results from regressions in which we duplicated models 1, 2, and 4 in Table 3 , except that we included the four individual demographic dissimilarity measures instead of the aggregate faultline measure. To conserve space, we only report regression statistics for the four demographic measures, as well as the overall model statistics.
As can be seen, there is evidence of significant, positive effects from each of the four types of demographic differences. Age differences were positively related to task conflict; tenure differences were positively associated with emotional and task conflict; gender differences were positively related to emotional conflict and behavioral disintegration; and ethnic differences were positively related to all three process variables. Thus, it appears that the results based upon the aggregate measure were not driven by just one or two demographic variables. At this point, it seems there is merit in continuing to theorize about the effects of overall factional faultline size, rather than in trying to isolate the effects of individual demographic variables.
We also experimented with alternative measures of demographic differences (e.g., Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, & Mount, 1998; Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002) . One experiment was to measure demographic differences as the absolute difference between the two factions, without then dividing by the sum of the two standard deviations. The results were consistently and appreciably weaker than those we have presented, indicating that our conception of distinct differences-whereby two factions differ widely in their central tendencies and each faction is tightly clustered around its own average-is a fruitful way to think about demographic faultlines in factional groups. Another experiment was prompted by Edwards's (1994) concern about using absolute differences to measure demographic dissimilarity. Specifically, he argued that directional differences in demography are sometimes more important than absolute differences; in our setting, for instance, it may be that age differences per se were not as consequential as, say, the degree to which the local PRC managers were older than the expatriate managers. To examine this possibility, we reconstructed our measures of demographic differences as arithmetic (signed) differences, rather than absolute differences. The results were appreciably weaker than those we have reported, suggesting that, at least in the context we examined, a focus on absolute differences in demography was valid.
Overall, our study reaffirms the role of demography in influencing group processes and outcomes (Jehn, 1999; Pelled et al., 1999) but also opens up a new research avenue by addressing the relational demography (Tsui & O'Reilly, 1989) of subgroups, or factions, within broader groups. We can envision a wide array of groups, including merger integration teams and bilateral task forces of many types, for which demographic faultlines between a priori factions would be highly predictive of process outcomes. As a final way to highlight the distinctive properties of factional groups, we used some limited available data to explore a fundamental question: Do factional groups generally experience more process problems than nonfactional groups? Using data (which we have otherwise excluded from our analyses) on 21 JV management groups in which all members were from just one JV parent, and hence were "nonfactional," we added a dummy variable (0, "nonfactional group," n ϭ 21; 1, "factional group," n ϭ 71) to the basic regression models presented in Table 3 (models 1, 2, and 4). For all three group process variables (emotional conflict, task conflict, and behavioral disintegration), the factional group dummy exhibited a significant (p Ͻ .05), positive coefficient. Because our sample of nonfactional groups was small, these findings are far from definitive. Still, they suggest that the drawbacks of factional groups arise at two levels: First, factional groups, in general, have more process problems than do nonfactional groups. These problems are due to the inherent schisms, and the resulting tensions and skepticism, that exist in such groups. Second, among factional groups, the bigger the demographic faultlines between the factions, the greater the process problems that will occur-in line with our primary line of thought and empirical results.
Indeed, analysts who attribute the failure of interorganizational collaborations or combinations (mergers, joint ventures, bilateral peacekeeping forces, interdepartmental task forces) to an amorphous "culture clash" typically overlook the reality that collaborative efforts are played out in conference rooms, hallway conversations, e-mail exchanges, and phone calls in which small groups of people from two sides are trying to hammer out joint products. If enough of these small groups experience stereotyping, emotional conflict, and behavioral disintegration, then the overall collaborative enterprise is jeopardized. We would argue that opportunities for diagnosis, intervention, and prescription are greatly enhanced by paying attention to the small groups that are composed to carry out a collaboration, instead of simply focusing on whether the two broad entities are "compatible."
FUTURE RESEARCH AND SUMMARY
Our study raises a number of questions that need to be addressed in future research. An obvious need is to explore the ways in which the effects of factional faultlines can be mitigated. It may be, for instance, that designing the reward structure to emphasize group performance, rather than subunit or individual performance, will help to suppress the divisive processes we have documented. Similarly, training programs and careful member selection processes could help to minimize the harmful byproducts of factional groups.
Another interesting research avenue would be to explore the role of member identity in factional groups. We portray group members as having divided, or torn, identities, partly identifying with their groups and partly identifying with their external sponsors. The literature on social identity could provide a valuable conceptual lens for understanding the tensions experienced by members of factional groups (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Ashforth & Mael, 1989) .
We did not examine differences in national culture between factions, because there was insufficient variation across our sample: the local parents were all from the People's Republic of China, and the foreign parents were all American and western European. However, a more diverse set of joint venture parent nationalities could allow examination of the impact of cultural differences between parents (e.g., Harrison & Huntington, 2000) .
Finally, while we focused on management groups in JVs, the concept of factional faultlines can be applied to other contexts in which representational subgroups exist. These would include merger integration teams or bilateral task forces.
Prior research on demography and diversity in organizations has shown that overall group heterogeneity affects group processes. We have argued that, in factional groups, the sizes of the demographic faultlines between factions are more strongly related to conflict and behavioral disintegration than are customary measures of overall group heterogeneity. Our study of Sino-foreign joint venture management teams, prototypical instances of factional groups, provides empirical support for this fundamental premise. We find that process losses, or dysfunctions, arise in proportion to the size of demographic faultlines along the preexisting schism that separates the two parental factions in JV management teams. We also find that these process losses-particularly emotional conflict and behavioral disintegration-are strongly associated with subsequently poor performance. Our study thus offers an important additional explanation for the high failure rate of international joint ventures (Kogut, 1988) . It is also broadly applicable to an array of situations in which groups consist of distinct factions representing outside entities.
